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We examine whether investor mood, driven by World Health Organization (WHO) alerts
and media news on dangerous infectious diseases, is priced in pharmaceutical companies'
stocks in the United States. We argue that disease-related news (DRNs) should not trigger
rational trading. We find that DRNs have a positive and significant sentiment effect among
investors (on Wall Street). The effect is stronger (weaker) for small (large) companies, who
are less (more) likely to engage in the development of new vaccines. A potential negative
investor climate (on Main Street) – induced by disease-related fear – does not alter the
positive sentiment effect.
& 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
A relatively large number of studies show that investor sentiment may drive agents' investment decisions (De Long et al.,
1990; Cen and Liyan-Yang, 2013; Kaplanski and Levy, 2015). In this respect, the behavioral finance literature provides solid
evidence supporting the existence of a significant relation between stock returns and investor sentiment (Loughran and
Schultz, 2004; Cao and Wei, 2005; Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Kaplanski and Levy, 2010a,b; Curatola et al., 2016). Investor
sentiment is typically defined as a belief about future cash flows and investment risks that is not justified by the facts at
hand (Baker and Wurgler, 2007, p. 129). Certain events may induce either a positive or a negative sentiment that strongly
affects investors' investment decisions and, thus, the corresponding stock market prices.
Early studies observe, for example, that sunshine, which is well known to be a driver of peoples' mood, tends to comove
positively with daily stock returns (see Saunders, 1993; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003). Yuan et al. (2006) find that lunar
phases may affect stock market returns. More recent studies find that international sporting games – and in particular
soccer games – heavily affect investor sentiment, and in turn, stock market returns (Edmans et al., 2007; Kaplanski and Levy,
2010a). Kaplanski and Levy (2010b) show that major aviation disasters tend to generate a negative sentiment within two(M. Donadelli), renatas.kizys@port.ac.uk (R. Kizys), max.riedel@web.de (M. Riedel).
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Financial Stability Facility on bank share prices.
Key in this research is the possibility – hitherto unaccounted for in the literature – that large events of devastating nature
to the economy and society can be regarded as good news to some interest groups, such as stock market investors. Dif-
ferently from the existing work, we rely on dangerous infectious diseases (i.e., SARS, Influenza A(H1N1), Polio, and Ebola),
which are perceived by the general public (Main Street) as large negative developments, but can generate sector-specific
positive investor sentiment (Wall Street). Specifically, our main contribution consists of employing a novel mood variable
(disease-related news or DRNs), based on the World Health Organization's (WHO's) alerts and media news related to
dangerous infectious diseases, to examine the effect of investor sentiment on pharmaceutical stock prices. Our principal
hypothesis is that fear of dangerous infectious diseases will be negatively associated with investor sentiment, whereas DRNs
will positively affect investment in pharmaceutical stocks. This hypothesis builds on the argument that while dangerous
infectious diseases spread fear and generate negative sentiment, investors unrealistically anticipate an increase in the cash
flows of pharmaceutical companies due to selling medicines aimed at fighting the disease.
Thus, investor sentiment about the performance of pharmaceutical companies may be one key element that drives
financial investment decisions. This notwithstanding, there is a dearth of research into pharmaceutical companies' stock
market performance (Himmelmann and Schiereck, 2012; Theodossiou and Theodossiou, 2014).
To the best of our knowledge, the relation between pharmaceutical stock returns and investor sentiment – driven by
DRNs – has not been investigated, with the exception of Huberman and Regev (2001). Huberman and Regev (2001) use a
case study to investigate the effect of investor enthusiasm to a major breakthrough in cancer research. Interestingly, the
stock price of EntreMed, a biopharmaceutical company, responded stronger to the breakthrough five months later, when it
was reported in the popular media, than when it was originally announced in Nature. Nevertheless, the authors neither
(i) generalize their research findings to the whole pharmaceutical industry, nor (ii) focus on the investor sentiment effect on
stock prices and returns, nor (iii) design global disease-news-induced trading strategies.
The main contribution of this study is to evaluate the balance between two contrasting effects of outbreaks of dangerous
diseases. On the one hand, we recognize the possibility that some infectious diseases spread fear among the general public and
stock market investors, which triggers a negative (fear-induced) sentiment in pharmaceutical stock prices. On the other hand, an
outbreak of an infectious disease is expected to have a positive sector-specific sentiment effect on pharmaceutical stock prices.
Methodologically, accounting for the two competing (negative and positive) effects manifests in a unique framework that al-
leviates the possibility of spurious correlations. In this study, we address the following questions that have not been examined in
the context of the pharmaceutical stock market. First, does investors' fear gauge, which is provoked by DRNs, lead to a decrease
in pharmaceutical stock market returns? Second, does an outbreak of a dangerous infectious disease trigger a positive sector-
specific investor sentiment effect on pharmaceutical stock prices? Third, does investor sentiment (optimism or pessimism) about
the future performance of pharmaceutical companies persist over time? Fourth, do the stock prices of large pharmaceutical
stocks respond to DRNs differently than the stock prices of small pharmaceutical stocks?
To address these issues, we use the prices of 102 pharmaceutical firms' stocks traded in the U.S. stock market to construct
four different investment portfolios. In addition, as a robustness check, we consider the S&P 500 Information Technology
Index. Our empirical strategy draws on two commonly used—event-study and regression-based—methodologies to evaluate
the investor sentiment effect on stock prices of pharmaceutical firms following DRNs.
We identify a significantly positive and persistent investor sentiment in the stock returns of pharmaceutical companies
following DRNs. This may be generated by positive beliefs about R&D investments in the aftermath of disease outbreaks. The
persistence of investor sentiment may be reflected in information salience as well (Palomino et al., 2009). Furthermore, we
construct a fear gauge index by employing Chicago Board Options Exchange's (CBOE's) Volatility Index (VIX) as a proxy for
investor fear. The index always exerts a negative and significant effect on the returns of pharmaceutical companies' stocks.
We find that sentiment tends to exert a stronger effect on small firms than on large firms. This finding is along the lines of
Qiu and Welch (2004), who observe that, under certain conditions, small firm returns become a proxy for investor senti-
ment (Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Edmans et al., 2007). Our results are supported by a battery of robustness checks.
Overall, our findings give rise to profitable trading strategies where an investor takes a long position in a portfolio of
pharmaceutical stocks and a short one in the VIX. These strategies lead to a positive and significant performance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide the background and motivation to the study. In
Section 3, we describe our mood variable DRNs and report descriptive statistics. In Section 4, we outline the methodology and
formulate our main hypotheses. In Section 5, we discuss the estimation results. In Section 6, we design hypothetical trading
strategies. Finally, in Section 7, we provide some concluding remarks and discuss the practical usefulness of our results.2. Motivation and background
In this section, we motivate our analysis by reviewing studies on economic effects of dangerous infectious diseases and
by investigating media coverage after a disease outbreak. We also discuss the recent developments in the U.S. pharma-
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In the asset pricing literature, a variety of mood variables have been considered. For instance, weather conditions
(Saunders, 1993; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003), hours of daylight in fall and winter (Kamstra et al., 2003), international
soccer results (Edmans et al., 2007; Kaplanski and Levy, 2010a; Curatola et al., 2016), and negative newspaper articles
(Tetlock, 2007). Notably, investor sentiment is found to have a significant impact on stock market returns. Mehra and Sah
(2002) relate in a theoretical framework the effect of feelings on investors' decision making in financial markets. Nofsinger
(2005) finds that interpersonal communication, leading to “social mood,” translates into emotions such as optimism,
pessimism, happiness, or anxiety. A general finding is that fear leads to negative asset returns, while positive emotions
increase investors' willingness to take risks.
In this study, we hypothesize that increased media coverage of dangerous infectious diseases has a positive and relatively
persistent effect on pharmaceutical stocks. Despite the overall negative sentiment in the population due to fear of being
infected, public and political demand for containing an infectious disease can lead to additional income channels for
pharmaceutical companies. Typical reactions to an infectious illness include higher R&D investment (partially subsidized by
the government), vaccine mass orders, or a general increase in demand for preventive measures (e.g., medicine, disinfection
agents, and surgical masks). We focus on four major infectious diseases that were regarded as a Public Health Emergency of
International Concern (PHEIC) by the WHO. The outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003, Influenza A
(H1N1) in 2009, and Polio and Ebola in 2014 were all more or less intensively covered by media.
The role of mass media in communication of potential risks has been subject to intense debate. It is argued that low-
probability, high-consequence events, such as potential health risks associated with outbreaks of rare diseases, are over-
emphasized in media-generated news waves. This unbalanced reporting leads to a disjunction between actual and people's
perceived risk (Vasterman et al., 2005; Mairal, 2011; Young et al., 2013). For instance, a representative survey conducted by
Blendon et al. (2004) indicates that 69% of respondents living in Ontario, 57% in Canada excluding Ontario, and 32% in the U.
S. were concerned about contracting SARS, whereas, educative and informative communication efforts in Singapore resulted
in a much lower overall anxiety level. Quah and Hin-Peng (2004) report that only 14% of respondents viewed SARS as a
personal risk in May 2003. Public overreaction and panic can also lead to adverse economic effects. In particular, sectors
such as tourism or retail sales fall due to individuals' preventive measures, such as reduction in traveling to the affected
areas or avoidance of public places. In the case of SARS, Hanna and Yiping (2004) estimate the total cost at about 0.5% of GDP
in China, while Keogh-Brown and Smith (2008) assess the global economic impact between 30 billion USD and 100 billion
USD. Using a general equilibrium model for the U.K., Smith et al. (2009) estimate costs related to Influenza A (H1N1)
between 0.5% and 1.0% of U.K.'s GDP. However, the total economic burden is difficult to quantify since both direct health care
costs as well as indirect costs of work absenteeism and loss of productivity have to be taken into account.
In the spirit of Kaplanski and Levy (2010b), we search for media articles related to dangerous infectious diseases in order
to (i) gain better understanding of the scale and timing of the information salience of such diseases and (ii) to evaluate the
importance of the information salience as a potential source of investor sentiment in the pharmaceutical industry. Fig. 1
illustrates the normalized number of media news informing the general public about the disease outbreaks mentioned
above of the four. It is evident from Fig. 1 that the frequency of the related news notably increases on the announcement dayFig. 1. Media coverage around WHO PHEIC alerts.
Notes: This figure depicts the normalized number of distinct, disease-related newspaper articles published in the U.S. around the event days. The event
dates (t¼0) are considered to be the official WHO PHEIC statements. The number of articles relies on all four disease announcements and is normalized
relative to the its peak value over the 19-day period. The dotted line represents the average relative value across the 19-day period. Black diamonds
illustrate the absolute number of disease-related newspaper articles. Data are obtained using the LexisNexis database for global news and business
information.
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after the official PHEIC announcement. In addition, the absolute number of news announcements remains above the average
up to six days after the announcement. This is not surprising since PHEIC statements are followed by other official/in-
stitutional news, which is used to build our event-day mood variable in the next section. Specifically, in two out of the four
cases, an event (i.e., DRNs) was taking place on any of the six days following a PHEIC announcement. These observations
provide support for the existence of a relatively strong relation between official news and media coverage and therefore
between DRNs and investor sentiment. Moreover, they suggest that the sentiment effect lasts for several days. This evidence
provides support for the persistent sentiment hypothesis formulated in Section 4.
2.2. The pharmaceutical industry
The pharmaceutical industry is at the heart of the U.S. economy. Although public and private spending on pharma-
ceuticals in the U.S. collectively contributed just over 2% (around 1000 USD) to the country's GDP per capita in 2011 (OECD,
2013),1 this share was the largest among the OECD countries. In 2009, the overall U.S. health care expenditures accounted
for 18% of the country's GDP, but it is estimated to contribute 37% in 2050.2 Furthermore, biopharmaceutical companies in
the U.S. account for the largest share of all U.S. companies' R&D expenditures, which represents nearly 20% of all domestic
R&D (PhRMA, 2015).3 It is one of the fastest growing industries. Indeed, both revenues and R&D spending by the U.S.
biopharmaceutical industry tripled from 1996 to 2008 (Lazonick and Tulum, 2011). Further, Offit (2005) documents an
increase in the market concentration of vaccine producers in the U.S. over past decades. Specifically, there are currently only
four FDA-approved U.S.-based publicly traded vaccine producers and distributors.4 The reasons for companies undertaking
or quitting vaccine production are multifold. On the one hand, research, development, testing, and manufacturing of vac-
cines are costly; on the other hand, the market for selling vaccines is smaller than the market for pharmaceutical drugs, to
name just few reasons. However, high entry barriers for the development of a new vaccine bears potential for monopoly.
Additionally, there is no manufacturing of generic vaccines, as vaccine production is substantially more complicated and
technologically advanced than drug production.5 The result is an increase in vaccine shortages, especially for flu vaccines
(Hinman et al., 2006). The emergence of a dangerous infectious disease can thus be regarded as a potentially new market for
vaccine producers, along with subsidized R&D. Therefore, it is surprising that research focusing on the effects of investor
sentiment on the stock prices of pharmaceutical companies has been underwhelming.
2.3. The U.S. stock market and investor attention to pharma-stocks
In this study, we focus on the U.S. stock market. There are two main reasons to select the U.S. stock market for this study:
(1) it is one of the most closely followed markets in the world and, as such, it is very efficient with respect to new in-
formation and it is also the most liquid market (Kaplanski and Levy, 2010a); (2) the U.S. stock market is one of the leading
stock markets in the world and accounts for about 40% of the global market (Hou et al., 2011).6 Our study is further mo-
tivated by the growing role of pharmaceutical stocks within the industry of financial services in the United States. Perceptive
Life Sciences Offshore Fund (859 million USD), Traxis Sivik Global Healthcare Offshore (44 million USD), and Visium Ba-
lanced Offshore Fund CL2 (3697 million USD) are examples of the sector-specific equity funds investing exclusively in
biopharmaceutical stocks.7 There is also a large number of funds with significant exposure to the stocks of (main) individual
pharmaceutical companies. Indeed, Table 1 indicates that, as of second quarter of 2014, institutional investors held sig-
nificant positions in the largest pharmaceutical firms' stocks, including Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, Merck & Company, As-
traZeneca, Amgen, and Gilead Sciences Inc.3. Data
In this section, we briefly describe our DRNs collection procedure and the construction of the pharmaceutical portfolios.
3.1. Announcements of dangerous infectious diseases
The data cover the entire history of dangerous infectious diseases that were considered as PHEICs by the WHO – a 12-1 Source: OECD Health Statistics (2013).
2 Source: The Statistics Portal (Statista), 2015 (available at www.statista.com/statistics/215163/us-health-expenditure-as-percentage-of-gdp-forecast).
3 Source: The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) (available at www.phrma.org/economic-impact).
4 FDA's “Complete List of Vaccines Licensed for Immunization and Distribution in the U.S.” includes Emergent Biosolutions, Johnson & Johnson, Merck,
and Pfizer (available at www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/Vaccines/ApprovedProducts/ucm093833.htm).
5 A generic drug is defined by the WHO as “a pharmaceutical product, usually intended to be interchangeable with an innovator product, that is
manufactured without a license from the innovator company and marketed after the expiry date of the patent or other exclusive rights.” Available at www.
who.int/trade/glossary/story034/en.
6 The average volume of stocks traded (as % of GDP) in the U.S. over the last decade is above 200% (Source: World Development Indicators).
7 Source: HSBC Hedge Weekly n. 28 - Investment Fund Performance Review, July 2014.
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Table 1
Institutional investors' positions in (main) pharmaceutical stocks.
Pharmaceutical company Fund (% of pharmaceutical stocks held)
Pfizer Jana Partners (0.05%); Fairfax Financial Holdings (0.48%); Orbimed Advisors (1.42%); Eton Park Capital Management
(1.53%); Boyar Asset Management (3.94%); York Capital Management Global Advisors (1.35%); Farallon Capital Manage-
ment (0.43%); Muhlenkamp and Co (0.21%)
Johnson & Johnson Berkshire Hathaway (0.03%); Fairfax Financial Holdings (0.61%); Perry Corp (0.99%); Orbimed Advisors (0.59%); Boyar
Asset Management (2.14%)
GlaxoSmithKline Chou Associates Management (0.14%)
Merck & Co. Fairfax Financial Holdings (0.05%); Orbimed Advisors (1.72%); Healthcor Management (1.69%); Vertex One Asset Man-
agement (0.67%); Sarissa Capital (7.87%)
Abbott Laboratories Southeastern Asset Management (2.98%)
AstraZeneca Chou Associates Management (0.28%); Third Point (0.91%); Corvex Management (1.09%); Duquesne Family Office (1.11%);
Highfields Capital Management (0.76%); York Capital Management Global Advisors (1.20%)
Amgen Third Point (0.65%); Orbimed Advisors (3.12%); Pennant Capital Management (0.50%); Highline Capital Management
(7.06%); Sarissa Capital (1.81%)
Eli Lilly and Company Highfields Capital Management (2.13%)
Bristol-Myers Squibb Orbimed Advisors (4.09%); Boyar Asset Management (2.12%); Muhlenkamp and Co (1.82%)
Gilead Sciences Baker Bros. Advisors (0.26%); Palo Alto Investors (0.95%); Orbimed Advisors (3.34%); Pennant Capital Management
(3.07%); Argonaut Capital Management (1.25%); Healthcor Management (2.69%); Parnassus Investments (2.44%); Muh-
lenkamp and Co (2.12%)
Vertex Pharmaceuticals Orbimed Advisors (0.59%); Healthcor Management (3.88%)
Novo Nordisk Markel Corp (1.42%)
M. Donadelli et al. / Journal of Financial Markets ∎ (∎∎∎∎) ∎∎∎–∎∎∎ 5year period from March 2003 to December 2014. The infectious diseases period incorporates 146 DRNs, which we consider
to be our event days.8 We categorize the events into the following categories: WHO Statement, WHO Disease Outbreak
News, Approval, Government Order, Government Order Cancel, Research Funding, and Statement. Events that are con-
sidered to be a WHO Statement9 or WHO Disease Outbreak News10 are obtained from the official website of WHO. All the
other events are obtained through a rigorous online search.
WHO Statements are official statements communicated to the public with regard to any new and substantial information
related to a certain disease. For instance, on 8 August 2014 the “Statement on the 1st meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee
on the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa” informed on the current state of the Ebola outbreak. Additionally, the emergency
committee stated that conditions for a PHEIC had been met and provided advice on how to address the Ebola outbreak in the
affected countries. Typically, the popular media uses such WHO Statements to communicate the news to the public.
WHO Disease Outbreak News, on the other hand, are to some extent regular updates on the current situation and
include, for instance, news about the first cross-border transmissions of a disease. In the case of the SARS outbreak in 2003,
there were periods of daily updates, while news on the 2009 Influenza A (H1N1) outbreak were covered on a weekly basis.
We recognize that all regularly spaced updates may be anticipated by stock market investors and may be priced in prior to
the actual update. For this reason, our sample of announcements comprises only those updates that documented first-time
cross-border transmissions. This strategy helps ensure the independence of subsequent announcements, insofar as cross-
border transmissions of infectious diseases occur unpredictably. In the case of SARS, we observe a rapid spread across
countries within the first two months.11 In total, 29 countries were affected by the disease. In the case of Influenza A (H1N1),
the official list contains more than 214 countries and overseas territories or communities as of 1 August 2010. The virus
spreads quickly and our list includes a sizable number of first cross-border transmission dates (around 50). For polio, we
abstain from identifying first outbreak dates as there are only 10 event dates in total. Considering Ebola, we count 10 cross-
border transmissions in total. However, the disease was not under control at the time this paper was written.
In addition to WHO Statements and WHO Disease Outbreak News, we include release dates of official statements pro-
vided by government ministries and agencies, as well as individual publicly traded companies. Newly developed vaccines
are subject to governmental approval and a positive feedback might have a substantial impact on the share price of the
vaccine producing company, as well as on its competitors/followers. We use official press release dates provided by the
website of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and label them Approval. This category is only relevant
for Influenza A (H1N1). For SARS and Ebola, vaccines are still in development, while potent polio vaccines have existed for
decades. Government Order and Government Order Cancel refer to government purchases of vaccine and subsequent
cancellations of orders. Again, these dates refer to the Influenza A (H1N1) outbreak only. In the case of the SARS outbreak,
companies were granted research funding to develop a potent vaccine. We label the official dates of funding announcements8 WHO announcements and disease-based news released on weekend days are assumed to have an effect on Monday.
9 http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/en.
10 http://www.who.int/csr/don/en.
11 Occasionally there were false alarms. Some countries were temporarily included and subsequently removed from the list of affected countries (if a
SARS outbreak could not be confirmed in retrospect). We also include such false alarm dates in our analysis since the public is likely to take the information
as a fact without questioning its reliability at the time of publication.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Statistic EW VW TOP BOTTOM S&P 500 IT
Mean (%) 0.0077 0.0549 0.0159 0.0125 0.0366
Median (%) 0.0405 0.0586 0.0209 0.0000 0.0559
Maximum (%) 10.5582 10.1711 10.3673 8.2638 11.4610
Minimum (%) 7.1160 6.5238 7.7975 11.2926 9.6701
Std. Dev. (%) 1.2198 1.1391 1.0262 1.6259 1.3702
Skewness 0.3194 0.0210 0.1041 0.1746 0.0439
Excess Kurt. 4.5993 4.6354 9.0512 2.6647 6.3379
Jarque–Bera 2782.39 2772.99 10577.2 931.996 5184.43
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Ljung–Box Q5 29.581 8.2820 24.890 12.497 21.378
(0.0000) (0.1414) (0.0001) (0.0286) (0.0007)
Ljung–Box Q5
2 1036.22
(0.0000)
813.167
(0.0000)
1277.68
(0.0000)
54.547
(0.0000)
901.965
(0.0000)
Observations 3097 3097 3097 3097 3097
Notes: This table reports the descriptive statistics of continuously compounded day-to-day percentage returns on the five investment portfolios. EW
denotes returns on an equally weighted portfolio of pharmaceutical stocks. VW denotes returns on a (time-varying) value-weighted portfolio of phar-
maceutical stocks. TOP denotes returns on a constant-value-weighted portfolio of 10 largest pharmaceutical firms. BOTTOM denotes returns on a constant-
value-weighted portfolio of 10 smallest pharmaceutical stocks. S&P 500 IT denotes returns on the S&P 500 Information Technology Index. Q5 denotes the
Ljung–Box test statistic for the fifth-order cumulative autocorrelation of stock returns, and Q5
2 denotes the Ljung–Box test statistic for the fifth-order
cumulative autocorrelation of returns squared. The table also provides the p-values for the significance tests of the Jarque–Bera and Ljung–Box statistics (in
parentheses). We use daily data for the period 01/01/2003–11/13/2014 (a total of 3097 observations).
M. Donadelli et al. / Journal of Financial Markets ∎ (∎∎∎∎) ∎∎∎–∎∎∎6as Research Funding. The category Statement subsumes different, potentially influential, statements provided by govern-
ment officials and companies referring to the current situation with regard to a disease. All DRNs are classified and sum-
marized in Table A1 in the Appendix.
3.2. Descriptive statistics
The stock market data for end-of-trading-day prices and market values are retrieved from Thomson Reuters Datastream.
The cross-section includes 102 pharmaceutical companies that are listed either on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ). The pharmaceutical companies are listed in
Table A2 in the Appendix.
In addition, we retrieve the S&P 500 Information Technology Index. For non-U.S. based companies, we use the data on
American Depository Receipts (ADRs). This gives rise to a 12-year period with 3097 trading days from January 2003 to November
2014. To test for the impact of DRNs on pharmaceutical stock returns, we employ the rates of return on a variety of portfolios
comprising pharmaceutical stocks. Specifically, we construct four benchmark pharmaceutical portfolios. The first is an equally
weighted portfolio (EW). The EW portfolio draws on the literature on the optimality of portfolios of naïve investors (De Miguel
et al., 2009). The second is a value-weighted portfolio of all pharmaceutical stocks with time-varying market-value based weights
(VW). The third portfolio is a constant-value-weighted portfolio accounting for the 10 largest pharmaceutical stocks (TOP). The
fourth is a constant-value-weighted portfolio of the 10 smallest pharmaceutical stocks (BOTTOM). The VW portfolio emphasizes
the role of large companies as opposed to small companies. The TOP portfolio illustrates a real-world situationwhere investors are
constrained by cardinality constraints. The BOTTOM portfolio addresses our Hypothesis 4 stated in the next section. Finally, the
inclusion of the S&P 500 Information Technology Index (S&P 500 IT), a standardized and tradable diversified portfolio of stocks,
seeks to project our hypotheses on sectors other than the pharmaceutical. In doing so, we show that the DRNs positive sentiment
spreads to other sectors and confirm that the breadth of sentiment is not confined only to the pharmaceutical industry.
We compute continuously compounded day-to-day percentage returns on the aforementioned portfolios. The de-
scriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.
Over the sample period, the mean return on the VW portfolio of pharmaceutical stocks with time-varying weights,
0.0549%, was considerably greater than the mean of the remaining portfolios. The median follows a similar pattern with one
notable exception, where the difference between the mean and the median (and hence the ensuing asymmetries in the
probability density function) is largest for the EW portfolio. The range of variation between the maximum and the minimum
returns is greatest for the S&P 500 IT portfolio (11.46% and 9.67%, respectively) and lowest for the VW portfolio (10.17%
and 6.52%, respectively). The BOTTOM portfolio has the highest idiosyncratic risk, as measured by the standard deviation
(1.63%), whereas the TOP portfolio is the least risky to invest (1.03%). Moreover, portfolio returns are negatively skewed,
with an exception of the VW portfolio. The negative skewness implies that large negative returns are more likely than large
positive returns. Furthermore, returns on the five portfolios are leptokurtic, where the coefficient of excess kurtosis is
greater than zero. A high value of excess kurtosis contributes to the observed non-normality of returns for the five portfolios,
as measured by the Jarque–Bera test statistic. The Ljung–Box test statistic provides evidence of serial correlation in (squared)
returns. Therefore, our regression-based methodology in Section 4.3 is designed so as to account for heteroscedasticity.Please cite this article as: Donadelli, M., et al., Dangerous infectious diseases: Bad news for Main Street, good news for
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4.1. Testable hypotheses
In this section, we outline the testable hypotheses for pharmaceutical stock returns around DRNs. DRNs may give rise to
two conflicting sentiment effects: the DRNs positive effect and the fear effect. In this respect, Kaplanski and Levy (2012)
document a “negative and significant war sentiment effect” during the 1973 Arab–Israeli War in Israel, and a positive and
significant “holiday sentiment effect.” Firstly, DRNs may lead to anxiety, bad moods, and pessimism among the general
public and stock market investors, associated with a panic effect generated by overemphasized media coverage of dangerous
infectious diseases. In this scenario, anxiety and fear spread across different stock market sectors and may instigate a drop in
the pharmaceutical stock prices. In Hypothesis 1, we posit that the investor's fear gauge, provoked by DRNs, may lead to a
decrease in the rate of return of pharmaceutical stocks.
Hypothesis 1. DRNs may lead to bad moods among investors, which may negatively affect the portfolio returns of pharma-
ceutical stocks.
Secondly, dangerous infectious diseases may be perceived by investors as a profitable investment opportunity. They
unreasonably anticipate that a disease will trigger an increase in R&D expenditure by pharmaceutical companies. This
development generates a positive sentiment and hence raises demand for pharmaceutical stocks. As a result, portfolio
valuation increases. Thus, in Hypothesis 2, we posit a positive relation between DRNs and returns on pharmaceutical stocks.
Hypothesis 2. DRNs have a positive effect on the portfolio returns of pharmaceutical stocks.
Our third hypothesis predicts that investors initially underreact to an announcement of a dangerous infectious disease
but they overreact thereafter. Further, the degree of overreaction depends on the announcement's relative salience as
measured by media coverage (Palomino et al., 2009). Klibanoff et al. (1998) report that the larger the information salience of
an announcement, the faster the contents are incorporated into closed-end country funds' prices. Within the pharmaceu-
tical industry, considerable media coverage can cause significant changes in stock prices through continuous overreporting,
even though no genuinely new information becomes available to the market (Huberman and Regev, 2001). Thus, motivated
by the literature and the observed inflow of information around PHEIC alerts (see Fig. 1), we posit in Hypothesis 3 that a
positive sentiment by stock market investors can remain at an elevated level after the event.
Hypothesis 3. DRNs have a persistent effect on the portfolio returns of pharmaceutical stocks. Such persistence is consistent with
an inflow of disease-related information in the stock market.
Our fourth hypothesis builds on the notion that investor sentiment should affect small cap stocks stronger relative to
large cap stocks (Brown and Cliff, 2005). Therefore, we expect that on and after the event day, investor sentiment will be
potentially stronger for small pharmaceutical firms than for large firms. This hypothesis is supported by recent studies
suggesting that the stocks of small firms are mainly held by local investors who tend to be largely influenced by specific
events (Edmans et al., 2007). Furthermore, even though large pharmaceutical companies act as forerunners of R&D activ-
ities, it may be less costly for small pharmaceutical companies to act as followers in the development of new drugs.12
However, vaccine production requires more costly and sophisticated technologies than drug production (Hinman et al.,
2006). The costs of developing effective new vaccines place a constraint on small pharmaceutical firms. As a result, they are
likely to develop new vaccines less frequently than large firms. Thus, we posit in Hypothesis 4 that investor sentiment,
driven by DRNs, will have a larger effect on the prices of small pharmaceutical stocks in comparison with large stocks.
Hypothesis 4. DRNs have a greater effect on stock returns of small companies relative to large companies.
Two commonly used—the event-study and regression-based—methodologies are used to test Hypotheses 1–4.
4.2. Event study methodology
In the spirit of traditional event studies, we begin our analysis by computing cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around
DRNs. The abnormal returns are defined as the difference between the observed rate of return of a pharmaceutical portfolio
and its ex-post expected rate of return over the whole length of the event window. The expected rate of return is estimated
based on the Fama–French three-factor model.13 We choose an event window length to cover 14 days prior and 14 days after
DRNs. The estimation window for the model is 252 days long.
In our sample, we observe temporal clustering of DRNs. This means that if all DRNs were taken into account, the CARs would12 Despite the well-documented first-mover advantage in the pharmaceutical industry, “under the current law, the chemical formula and the efficacy
of the cure as established by clinical trials are made available for competitors essentially for free” (Boldrin and Levine, 2013, p. 13). When patents expire,
low-cost generics are immediately introduced into the market.
13 The daily data for the factors SMB, HML, and the excess return on the market were obtained from Kenneth French's website (http://mba.tuck.
dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french).
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Fig. 2. Cumulative abnormal returns of pharmaceutical stocks.
Notes: This figure depicts the average cumulative residuals around the event date (t¼0) for pharmaceutical portfolios EW, VW, TOP, and BOTTOM. The
residual on day t is calculated as the difference between observed rate of return and the ex-post expected rate of return on day t. The three-factor model is
α β β β= + ( − ) + + + ϵr r r smb hmlt m t f t t t1 , 2 3 , where rt is the pharmaceutical portfolio return and −r rm t f, , smbt and hmlt are Fama–French factors. The es-
timation window is 252 days. The solid (dashed) line represents the Last (First) event approach when estimating the CARs. This ensures that event
windows are non-overlapping. Panels A and B illustrate the two different estimation procedures graphically. The Last (First) event approach includes event
days τ0, τ3 and τ4 (τ0, τ1 and τ4) in the estimation procedure. The events occurred during a 12-year period (March 2003–December 2014) which includes 33
event days with non-overlapping event windows.
M. Donadelli et al. / Journal of Financial Markets ∎ (∎∎∎∎) ∎∎∎–∎∎∎8suffer from overlapping event windows. For this reason, our CAR calculations include only a subset of all available DRNs. The
DRNs are selected according to the following two criteria. In the first selection procedure, Last event, we choose the DRNs only if
it is not followed by other DRNs within 28 days after its occurrence. For First event, on the other hand, we select the DRNs in a
chronological order. We start with the first DRNs in the sample, ignore all DRNs showing up in the proximate 28 days, take the
next DRNs in succession, ignore the following 28 days, and so on. This iteration proceeds until the whole sample is exhausted.
For illustration, assume there are five DRNs taking place at dates τ0, τ1, τ2, τ3, and τ4, where τ1, τ2, and τ3 are temporally
clustered. Then, for Last event, we use DRNs for CAR calculation occurring on days τ0, τ3, and τ4; for First event, we choose
τ0, τ1, and τ4. Panels A and B in Fig. 2 illustrate these two simple examples.
4.3. Regression-based methodology
We follow existing empirical studies (Kamstra et al., 2003; Edmans et al., 2007; Kaplanski and Levy, 2010a,b; Curatola
et al., 2016) to evaluate the impact of DRNs on pharmaceutical stock returns, and to identify the negative fear effect. We thus
implement the following regression model:
∑ ∑β β β β β β= + + + + + +
( )=
−
=
R R D D E FI u ,
1
p t
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i p t i
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i i t t
TAX
t t p t, 0
1
5
1, ,
1
4
2, , 3 4 5 ,
where Rp t, is the daily rate of return on a pharmaceutical stock portfolio p at time t, β0 is the regression intercept, and −Rp t i,
are lagged dependent variables. D1, D2, D3, and D4 are dummy variables for Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday,
respectively, and DTAXt is a dummy variable for the first five days of the taxation year. Further, Et represents the DRNs effect
variable, FIt denotes a fear index, and up t, is an error term. In line with existing studies, the VIX is used to proxy the
investment fear index also known as “investor fear gauge” (Whaley, 2009).14 Specifically, in the spirit of Bloom (2009), our
fear indicator is a dummy variable that takes on value 1 when the U.S. stock market volatility exceeds by more than 1.65
standard deviations the Hodrick–Prescott detrended λ( = ( ) )⁎1600 365/4 4 mean of the VIX, and 0 otherwise.15
The coefficient β4 captures the contemporaneous effect of DRNs on the portfolio rate of return. It should be noted that
most DRNs (85%) are published by the WHO, which is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland. Due to different time zones,
we assume that the U.S. stock market reacts on the day of DRNs publication. Further, previous days' rates of return, −Rp t i, ,14 We consider the VIX an adequate proxy as the correlation between the 252-day rolling standard deviation of the S&P 500 Index (S&P 500) and the
pharma portfolios is rather high (average correlations are reported in parentheses): EW (0.79), VW (0.72), TOP (0.82), and BOTTOM (0.78).
15 The fear effect FIt overlaps with the sentiment effect generated by DRNs in 119 out of 146 cases.
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sure that all serial correlations have been accounted for. The dummy variables for the days of the week are employed to
account for the so-called “Monday effect.”
To account for a possible positive sentiment effect on the days following DRNs, or differently, for a possible reversal
effect, we run also the following regression:
∑ ∑ ∑β β β β β β= + + + + + +
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5. Results
5.1. Event study methodology
Fig. 2 depicts the CARs around the event date. The solid (dashed) line depicts the Last event (First event) approach. The Last
event approach gives rise to positive abnormal returns following the event day for the EW and BOTTOM portfolios. The increase
prior to the event can be attributed to the sensitivity of the Last event approach to the contiguous (preceding) events in the
overlapping window. The First event approach points to an increase in returns of the EW and BOTTOM portfolios on the event
day. This increase is rather persistent on the days following the event, thus, confirming that those DRNs that were discarded in
the CAR calculation had a positive impact on pharmaceutical stock returns. The results are less supportive for the VW and TOP
portfolios. The event study results are weaker than the regression results reported in the next section due to the fact that only 33
out of 146 DRNs were employed in the CAR analysis. In general, EW Last/First (VW, TOP, and BOTTOM) experienced in 27%/30.7%
(34.6%/42.3%, 38.4%/42.3%, and 53.8%/50%) of all event cases a significant CAR at the 10% level. The CAR analysis provides
evidence supporting the persistent (positive) sentiment effect hypothesis (Hypothesis 3). One could anticipate that the SMB
factor in the three-factor Fama–French model already captures some of the effect of investment sentiment, biasing the estimate
of CARs. Indeed, if investors holding smaller cap stocks become more optimistic, then the SMB factor increases, and the CAR
decreases. We also compute the CARs by employing the excess return on the market in a one-factor model.16 The unreported
results suggest more pronounced CARs for the BOTTOM portfolio. Overall, our event study analysis reveals a positive and
persistent effect of DRNs on the stock returns of pharmaceutical companies.
5.2. Regression analysis
Results examining the effect of the fear gauge and DRNs on the pharmaceutical stock market returns are reported in Table 3.
Panel A documents our main findings that result from incorporating all events in the regression analysis. For robustness pur-
poses, we also rerun our model on a subsample of DRNs by employing WHO-related announcements only (see Panel B).
Consistently with Hypothesis 1, a negative and significant effect of the fear gauge index is obtained. This effect is robust across
the five portfolios. The estimated coefficient β5 ranges from 0.1378 (TOP portfolio) to 0.2056 (VW portfolio). Thus, the effect
of investor fear gauge is strongest for diversified portfolios of stocks and weakest for large firms. Further, the DRNs variable effect
is always positive and generally significant at the 5% level, vindicating Hypothesis 2. The coefficient estimate ranges from 0.1781
(VW) to 0.3883 (S&P 500 IT). Thus, in the wake of DRNs, stock returns increase by roughly 18–39 bps. This is an interesting
finding, insofar as disease outbreaks, such as Ebola, may not actually spread in the United States. However, investor decisions can
be guided by sentiment. Paradoxically, while dangerous infectious diseases may impose non-negligible costs on the economy
and may potentially lead to the depletion of resources, DRNs can produce an optimistic view and a positive sentiment effect
among U.S. investors. They unreasonably anticipate that pharmaceutical companies whose stocks or ADRs are listed on the NYSE
or NASDAQ will invest in R&D and, potentially, raise their future cash flows.
However, investors overlook the fact that the patent system imposes constraints on investment and productivity growth in
the pharmaceutical industry (Boldrin and Levine, 2013). At the same time, they underestimate the probability that vaccines and
medicines are not necessarily effective (Shortridge, 2004). The results unambiguously indicate that investors should buy stocks
when an infectious disease outbreak is announced. Moreover, investment in a portfolio dominated by large cap stocks (such as
TOP or VW) when a disease outbreak is announced yields a lower return than investment in a portfolio of small cap stocks (such
as BOTTOM), ceteris paribus.17 This finding supports Hypothesis 4, wherein small cap stocks respond stronger to investor
sentiment than large cap stocks. This result agrees with Brown and Cliff (2005) and Edmans et al. (2007).
Table 4 further shows that the investor fear gauge has the smallest (largest) effect (in absolute value) for the TOP (VW)
portfolio (0.1481 and 0.2163, respectively). The investor fear gauge reflects investor pessimism regarding portfolio invest-
ment, which has a negative effect on stock prices and returns of pharmaceutical companies. This result confirms Hypothesis 1, in16 In the one-factor model, EW Last/First (VW, TOP, and BOTTOM) experienced in 42.3%/42.3% (46.1%/50%, 46.2%/50%, and 53.9%/50%) of all event cases
a significant CAR at the 10% level.
17 Either due to lower expenses related to sub-contracting (Assid et al., 2015) or less costly imitation of larger pharmaceutical companies (Boldrin and
Levine, 2013), small pharmaceutical stocks can potentially generate higher returns than large stocks.
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Table 3
Regression results (DRNs and fear effects).
Portf. Const. Rt1 Rt2 Rt3 Rt4 Rt5 Mon. Tues. Wed. Thurs. D
TAX Et FIt Logl.
Panel A: All DRNs þ fear effects
EW 0.1304nnn 0.0650nn 0.0222 0.0243 0.0194 0.0129 0.1093 0.0098 0.0544 0.0354 0.4168nnn 0.3861nnn 0.1819nnn 4977.15
(0.0032) (0.0151) (0.4916) (0.3863) (0.4605) (0.6770) (0.1037) (0.8746) (0.3915) (0.5939) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0000)
VW 0.1134nn 0.0346 0.0487 0.0049 0.0047 0.0022 0.0386 0.1777nnn 0.0433 0.0359 0.2843nn 0.1781n 0.2056nnn 4774.72
(0.0165) (0.1894) (0.1313) (0.8509) (0.8568) (0.9387) (0.5338) (0.0040) (0.4748) (0.5798) (0.0284) (0.0742) (0.0000)
TOP 0.0361 0.0393 0.0777n 0.0248 0.0061 0.0110 0.0531 0.1437nnn 0.0373 0.0249 0.1972n 0.2274nnn 0.1378nnn 4448.79
(0.3625) (0.2301) (0.0633) (0.4355) (0.8453) (0.7664) (0.3433) (0.0090) (0.4877) (0.6678) (0.0893) (0.0063) (0.0000)
BOTTOM 0.2192nnn 0.0309 0.0181 0.0096 0.0465nn 0.0105 0.3420nnn 0.2324nnn 0.0475 0.1129 0.5659nnn 0.3877nn 0.1842nnn 5872.04
(0.0011) (0.1472) (0.3684) (0.6147) (0.0218) (0.5691) (0.0001) (0.0088) (0.5946) (0.2241) (0.0025) (0.0235) (0.0012)
S&P 500 IT 0.0203 0.0837nnn 0.0350 0.0105 0.0056 0.0175 0.1016 0.2086nnn 0.1201 0.1027 0.3400n 0.3883nnn 0.1792nnn 5342.82
(0.6953) (0.0027) (0.2696) (0.7092) (0.8526) (0.6115) (0.1827) (0.0057) (0.1057) (0.1695) (0.0976) (0.0007) (0.0000)
Panel B: WHO Disease Outbreak News þ WHO Statements þ fear effects
EW 0.1426nnn 0.0650nn 0.0224 0.0252 0.0187 0.0132 0.1289n 0.0013 0.0631 0.0396 0.4184nnn 0.3968nnn 0.1811nnn 4978.71
(0.0013) (0.0151) (0.4868) (0.3676) (0.4796) (0.6712) (0.0552) (0.9834) (0.3212) (0.5514) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0000)
VW 0.1184nn 0.0350 0.0494 0.0048 0.0062 0.0022 0.0263 0.1754nnn 0.0393 0.0349 0.2884nn 0.2720nn 0.2089nnn 4773.51
(0.0124) (0.1841) (0.1254) (0.8535) (0.8141) (0.9400) (0.6724) (0.0045) (0.5167) (0.5897) (0.0260) (0.0111) (0.0000)
TOP 0.0431 0.0399 0.0781n 0.0247 0.0048 0.0106 0.0400 0.1393nn 0.0322 0.0228 0.1998n 0.2723nnn 0.1390nnn 4448.62
(0.2764) (0.2236) (0.0618) (0.4371) (0.8786) (0.7744) (0.4748) (0.0113) (0.5499) (0.6946) (0.0844) (0.0068) (0.0000)
BOTTOM 0.2335nnn 0.0314 0.0191 0.0087 0.0472nn 0.0112 0.3544nnn 0.2450nnn 0.0564 0.1190 0.5605nnn 0.2043 0.1760nnn 5875.19
(0.0005) (0.1414) (0.3422) (0.6487) (0.0198) (0.5440) (0.0001) (0.0057) (0.5263) (0.1999) (0.0026) (0.2936) (0.0020)
S&P 500 IT 0.0328 0.0828nnn 0.0346 0.0110 0.0071 0.0169 0.0830 0.1994nnn 0.1112 0.0979 0.3406n 0.3716nn 0.1773nnn 5344.64
(0.5269) (0.0030) (0.2753) (0.6966) (0.8142) (0.6244) (0.2769) (0.0083) (0.1348) (0.1906) (0.0962) (0.0110) (0.0000)
Notes: This table reports the results of Eq. (1). Results of regressions of continuously compounded day-to-day percentage returns on an equally weighted portfolio of pharmaceutical stocks (EW), value-weighted
portfolio (VW), constant-value-weighted portfolio of 10 largest pharmaceutical stocks (TOP), a constant-value-weighted portfolio of 10 smallest pharmaceutical stocks (BOTTOM), and S&P 500 Information
Technology Index (S&P 500 IT) are reported. VW is computed using time-varying weights, whereas TOP and BOTTOM are computed using constant weights, based on the initial market capitalization. Et represents
the DRNs effect variable. DRNs (i.e., event days) are reported in Table A1. In Panel A, Et is composed of all DRNs. In Panel B, Et is composed of WHO Disease Outbreak News and WHO Statements only. The log-
likelihood value of the estimated model is shown in the last column. The p-values are in parentheses. The Eicker–White standard error estimates are robust to heteroscedasticity. We use daily data for the period
01/01/2003–11/13/2014 (a total of 3097 observations).
n Significance at the 10% level.
nn Significance at the 5% level.
nnn Significance at the 1% level.
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Table 4
Regression results (DRNs contemporaneous and lagged effects and fear effects).
Portf. Const. Rt1 Rt2 Rt3 Rt4 Rt5 Mon. Tues. Wed. Thurs. D
TAX
∑ = −Ei t i0
6 FIt LogL.
Panel A: All DRNs þ fear effects
EW 0.1235nnn 0.0616nn 0.0196 0.0229 0.0163 0.0166 0.1171n 0.0005 0.0505 0.0327 0.4392nnn 0.7597nnn 0.1959nnn 4971.54
(0.0055) (0.0214) (0.5431) (0.4153) (0.5375) (0.5958) (0.0820) (0.9941) (0.4272) (0.6217) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0000)
VW 0.1099nn 0.0363 0.0490 0.0040 0.0071 0.0045 0.0281 0.1635nnn 0.0417 0.0405 0.3009nn 0.4860nnn 0.2163nnn 4767.39
(0.0195) (0.1668) (0.1293) (0.8769) (0.7851) (0.8784) (0.6514) (0.0085) (0.4940) (0.5319) (0.0202) (0.0011) (0.0000)
TOP 0.0333 0.0419 0.0795n 0.0227 0.0034 0.0134 0.0442 0.1316nn 0.0351 0.0253 0.2134n 0.5171nnn 0.1481nnn 4443.67
(0.4030) (0.2020) (0.0580) (0.4767) (0.9143) (0.7182) (0.4309) (0.0173) (0.5157) (0.6630) (0.0658) (0.0004) (0.0000)
BOTTOM 0.2182nnn 0.0335 0.0159 0.0124 0.0454nn 0.0091 0.3508nnn 0.2471nnn 0.0638 0.1262 0.5928nnn 0.8169nnn 0.1993nnn 5867.43
(0.0012) (0.1180) (0.4290) (0.5175) (0.0248) (0.6236) (0.0001) (0.0054) (0.4761) (0.1757) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0005)
S&P 500 IT 0.0160 0.0852nnn 0.0360 0.0096 0.0070 0.0188 0.0950 0.2034nnn 0.1237n 0.1041 0.3527n 0.6166nnn 0.1876nnn 5340.99
(0.7577) (0.0023) (0.2570) (0.7338) (0.8165) (0.5869) (0.2140) (0.0072) (0.0979) (0.1652) (0.0862) (0.0009) (0.0000)
Panel B: WHO Disease Outbreak News þ WHO Statements þ fear effects
EW 0.1370nnn 0.0621nn 0.0209 0.0233 0.0163 0.0169 0.1283n 0.0052 0.0550 0.0348 0.4348nnn 0.8091nnn 0.1978nnn 4973.93
(0.0022) (0.0205) (0.5174) (0.4055) (0.5365) (0.5883) (0.0601) (0.9344) (0.3936) (0.6014) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0000)
VW 0.1144nn 0.0363 0.0503 0.0032 0.0073 0.0044 0.0266 0.1727nnn 0.0369 0.0459 0.2989nn 0.5685nnn 0.2208nnn 4769.27
(0.0161) (0.1682) (0.1191) (0.9024) (0.7797) (0.8792) (0.6713) (0.0059) (0.5455) (0.4803) (0.0210) (0.0007) (0.0000)
TOP 0.0380 0.0414 0.0800n 0.0220 0.0029 0.0136 0.0436 0.1389nn 0.0304 0.0313 0.2111n 0.5780nnn 0.1511nnn 4444.44
(0.3418) (0.2077) (0.0564) (0.4902) (0.9255) (0.7146) (0.4406) (0.0130) (0.5760) (0.5924) (0.0683) (0.0009) (0.0000)
BOTTOM 0.2305nnn 0.0331 0.0153 0.0113 0.0447nn 0.0084 0.3466nnn 0.2614nnn 0.0512 0.1401 0.5886nnn 0.8869nnn 0.2025nnn 5868.26
(0.0007) (0.1204) (0.4486) (0.5544) (0.0279) (0.6506) (0.0001) (0.0035) (0.5693) (0.1356) (0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0004)
S&P 500 IT 0.0300 0.0839nnn 0.0345 0.0101 0.0089 0.0182 0.0815 0.1968nn 0.1177 0.1035 0.3447n 0.4854nn 0.1816nnn 5341.46
(0.5660) (0.0027) (0.2777) (0.7206) (0.7701) (0.5994) (0.2898) (0.0104) (0.1194) (0.1709) (0.0926) (0.0382) (0.0000)
Notes: This table reports the results of Eq. (2). Results of regressions of continuously compounded day-to-day percentage returns on an equally weighted portfolio of pharmaceutical stocks (EW), value-weighted
portfolio (VW), constant-value-weighted portfolio of 10 largest pharmaceutical stocks (TOP), a constant-value-weighted portfolio of 10 smallest pharmaceutical stocks (BOTTOM), and S&P 500 Information
Technology Index (S&P 500 IT) are reported. VW is computed using time-varying weights, whereas TOP and BOTTOM are computed using constant weights, based on the initial market capitalization. Et i
( = …i I0, 1, 2, , ) represents the DRNs contemporaneous and lagged effect variables. β∑ =i
I
i0 4, measures the accumulated effect of the lagged DRNs. DRNs (i.e., event days) are reported in Table A1. In Panel A, Et is
composed of all DRNs. In Panel B, Et is composed of WHO Disease Outbreak News and WHO Statements only. The log-likelihood value of the estimated model is shown in the last column. The p-values are in
parentheses. The Eicker–White standard error estimates are robust to heteroscedasticity. We use daily data for the period 01/01/2003–11/13/2014 (a total of 3097 observations).
n Significance at the 10% level.
nn Significance at the 5% level.
nnn Significance at the 1% level.
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to the results reported by Kaplanski and Levy (2012), wherein the investor fear gauge provoked by the 1973 Arab–Israeli War is
responsible for a negative effect on the stock market return of the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. Table 4 also indicates that the
investor sentiment effect is positive and persistent. We use six lags of DRNs to capture the persistence. The number of lags is
dictated by Fig. 1, which indicates that the number of media articles remains above average six days after PHEIC event. We thus
expect that the positive sentiment effect will last for six days due to a continuous flow of information in the stock market. We
test the combined effect of the contemporaneous and lagged DRNs on pharmaceutical stock returns. To this end, we test for the
significance of the coefficient sum β∑ =i
I
i0 4, , where I¼6. Entries related to this coefficient sum highlight that the DRNs positive
sentiment effect is stronger among small pharmaceutical firms (0.8169) and is weaker for the VW portfolio (0.4860). In all cases,
the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. The estimated lagged effects are consistent with Kaplanski and Levy (2010b), who
argue that the announcement typically receives headlines several days after the event. The estimation results for the five
portfolios show a positive and significant effect (at the 5% level) for at least six trading days after DRNs are released. Thus, our
results also support Hypothesis 3, wherein positive investor sentiment remains significant several days after the DRNs. This
result agrees with Huberman and Regev (2001), who underscore the importance of the information salience of a breakthrough
in biopharmaceutical research. The contemporaneous and lagged effects provide unequivocal evidence that DRNs have a positive
and significant (either contemporaneous or lagged) effect on pharmaceutical stock prices.
Fear gauge and DRNs can not only provoke changes in the pharmaceutical stock prices but also in the S&P 500 IT, an
industry unrelated to dangerous infectious diseases, thus lending further support to the investment sentiment effect.
Specifically, our results indicate that fear gauge (DRNs) always has a negative (positive) and significant effect on the stock
returns of the S&P 500 IT. This result shows that the investor sentiment effect can be widespread across various industries
and lead to profitable trading strategies.
We validate our research findings with a number of robustness checks. First, we examine the extent to which investor
sentiment can spread to other sectors of the economy and even to other countries. In this regard, the presence of investor
sentiment is identified in the S&P 500 Industrials Index, an industry seemingly unrelated to dangerous infectious diseases.
The impact of fear gauge and DRNs was also tested on regions that were directly affected by the four dangerous infectious
diseases. In particular, the estimation results show a negative (positive) and significant effect of fear gauge (DRNs) on returns
on the MSCI Emerging Markets stock market index. Second, to account for the presence of conditional heteroscedasticity in
daily stock returns, our regression methodology is extended to include a battery of GARCH specifications. As in the
benchmark methodology, the results show a negative (positive) and significant effect of fear gauge (DRNs) on pharma-
ceutical stock returns, endorsing the main findings. Third, as a complementary exercise, we vary the number of lags in Eq.
(2). The estimation results broadly support Hypothesis 3. Fourth, we perform all our regressions excluding the control
variables (i.e., with the DRNs and fear gauge variables only). Again, the main findings can be upheld. The general conclusion
that can be drawn from these robustness checks is that investor sentiment, triggered by dangerous infectious diseases, is
neither confined to the pharmaceutical industry nor is model-specific. By contrast, the presence of investor sentiment is
robust to the type of activity, the geographical scope, and the various methodological underpinnings.186. Exploiting sentiment and fear effects
Our empirical evidence asserts that an investor should be willing to exploit both sentiment and fear effects in response to
DRNs by building leverage positions in pharmaceutical stocks. For this purpose, we consider a zero-cost strategy. On event
days that coincide with high-volatility periods, as measured by the fear index, the zero-cost spread portfolio takes a 100%
long position in one of the four above mentioned pharmaceutical portfolios and a 100% short position in the VIX. We assume
that the investment horizon of the spread portfolio varies from one day (1D) to three days (3D). To eliminate timing-
inconsistencies, the trade is initiated at the closing price of the event day. This procedure ensures that no trade precedes
DRNs publication on any given event day.19 Table 5 reports the strategies' average performance. In Panel A, the results are for
all DRNs, while Panel B reports only the WHO-related subsample. The 1D strategy does not yield a significant performance
for all four pharmaceutical portfolios. Differently, a holding period of two or three days is remarkably profitable. Such
profitability is higher in the case of the EW and BOTTOM portfolios.
The longer term profitability of overweighting pharmaceutical stocks and underweighting the VIX is illustrated in Fig. 3.
Different from the zero-cost spread portfolio, whose profitability is summarized in Table 5, we now assume that an investor
holds a benchmark portfolio that is fully exposed to the stock market. That is, during tranquil times, 100% of an investor's
wealth is invested in the market portfolio, which is proxied by the S&P 500. On event days that coincide with high volatility
periods, the investor reallocates funds by going 150% long in a pharmaceutical portfolio and 50% short in the VIX and holds
the position between one (1D) and three (3D) days. The depicted outperformance is calculated as the difference between
the cumulative performance of a trading strategy and the market portfolio. A visual inspection suggests a similar18 All the additional checks are not reported but are available from the authors upon request.
19 A more precise approach would involve the exact publication time of the news in a given country and consider the time zone difference between the
U.S. and the respective country. Unfortunately, most DRNs do not have a time stamp. Nevertheless, our trading strategy is consistent in timing for those
DRNs that are accompanied with an exact publication time.
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Table 5
Trading strategies.
Investment horizon EW VW TOP BOTTOM
Panel A: All DRNs
1D 0.518 0.3755 0.4208 0.3941
(0.5208) (0.5085) (0.5036) (0.5226)
2D 1.6302nn 1.2548nn 1.2544nn 1.4261nn
(0.7754) (0.7551) (0.7386) (0.7592)
3D 1.913nn 1.433nn 1.4542nn 1.9172nnn
(0.8539) (0.8076) (0.8006) (0.8063)
Panel B: WHO Disease Outbreak News þ WHO Statements
1D 0.4991 0.3831 0.4181 0.424
(0.5725) (0.5618) (0.5555) (0.5877)
2D 1.6275nn 1.2644n 1.2491n 1.3749n
(0.8505) (0.8368) (0.8174) (0.8572)
3D 2.0802nn 1.6035nn 1.6335nn 2.1461nn
(0.9783) (0.9301) (0.9224) (0.9296)
Notes: This table reports the average performance (in %) of a spread portfolio that is invested 100% long in a pharmaceutical portfolio and 100% short in the
VIX. Long and short positions are taken only during high volatility states of the world (as indicated by the fear index) and using closing prices of the DRNs
day. The investment horizon of the portfolio varies between one (1D) and three days (3D). In Panel A, the trading strategy is based on all DRNs. In Panel B,
the trading strategy is based on WHO Disease Outbreak News and WHO Statements only. The trading period runs from January 2003 to November 2014
(3097 trading days). Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
n Significance of a one-tailed t-test at the 10% level.
nn Significance of a one-tailed t-test at the 5% level.
nnn Significance of a one-tailed t-test at the 1% level.
Fig. 3. Outperformance of DRNs and fear effect strategies.
Notes: This figure depicts the outperformance of portfolios that follow DRNs-based trading strategies. The strategies initiate a 150% long position in a
pharmaceutical portfolio (using closing prices of the DRNs day) and a 50% short position in the VIX on those event dates that coincide with high-volatility
states of the world as indicated by the fear index. During tranquil times (i.e., absence of DRNs), 100% of an investor's wealth is invested in the market
portfolio, which is proxied by the S&P 500. On event days that coincide with high volatility periods, the investor reallocates funds by going 150% long in a
pharmaceutical portfolio and 50% short in the VIX and holds the position one day (Panel A: 1D), two days (Panel B: 2D) or three days (Panel C: 3D). The
outperformance is calculated as the difference between the cumulative performance of the four trading portfolios and a long-only position in the market
portfolio. Assuming an initial investment of 1 USD, the application of the trading strategies 1D–3D to EW (VW, TOP, and BOTTOM) yields on average
between 0.48 and 2.05 USD (0.22–0.67 USD, 0.24–0.66 USD, and 0.29–2.02 USD) more than a long-only market exposure. The trading period runs from
January 2003 to November 2014 (3097 trading days).
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M. Donadelli et al. / Journal of Financial Markets ∎ (∎∎∎∎) ∎∎∎–∎∎∎14performance between the VW and TOP portfolios, while EW and BOTTOM are the more profitable strategies for all three
investment horizons (except during the period 2009–2014 in Panel A).
For robustness purposes, we ignore the fear effects and consider a simple buy-and-hold strategy that initiates a long position
in a pharmaceutical portfolio at the closing price of an event day and holds it for 14 days. The unreported results confirm that
this strategy would also have yielded a positive outperformance over the period examined. The EW (VW, TOP, and BOTTOM)
portfolio has on average a 1.6% (0.7%, 0.3%, and 1.7%) higher performance than the S&P 500 during a 14-day period.
Overall, we find that investment strategies exploiting sentiment and fear effect related to DRNs lead to higher profit-
ability. Once again, this result is most pronounced for the BOTTOM portfolio, confirming that investor sentiment tends to
have a greater effect on small cap stocks.7. Conclusion
Motivated by the abundance of recent behavioral finance studies showing that particular events (e.g., St. Patrick's Day,
the 1973 Arab–Israeli War, Rosh Hashanah, international sporting games) may have a strong effect on investors' moods, we
investigate whether DRNs have a positive and significant sentiment effect on investors interested in U.S. pharmaceutical
companies. This research builds on the notion that vaccine production for dangerous infectious diseases is concentrated in a
few large pharmaceutical companies. Indeed, the number of vaccine producers in the U.S. decreased dramatically over the
last four decades (Masignani et al., 2003).
Rational investors design trading strategies that are based on expectations of future cash flows of these companies. We argue
that rational trading should not occur for two reasons. First, in the wake of DRNs, uncertainty surrounding distant cash flows of
vaccine developers may be too high. Second, the resources of smaller pharmaceutical companies may be too limited to engage
in large-scale R&D. For instance, typically at least 850 million USD is needed to develop and license a new pharmaceutical
product (Masignani et al., 2003). As a result, pharmaceutical stock prices should not respond to DRNs. Thus, DRNs can only lead
to higher stock prices and returns of other pharmaceutical companies through altering investor sentiment about their future
performance and leading to irrational trading (Kaplanski and Levy, 2010b). The potential negative sentiment effect induced by
fear and anxiety due to DRNs is also tested, allowing us to account for two conflicting sentiment effects.
We find that during the period from 2003 to 2014 DRNs exert a positive and significant effect on pharmaceutical firms' stock
returns. This effect is relatively stronger for a portfolio of small cap stocks. We also find that the DRNs effect lasts for several
days. Consistent with the widely held view that a DRNs can also generate panic, fear, and anxiety among investors, we observe
that an ad hoc fear gauge index appears to exert a negative and significant effect on the returns of pharmaceutical companies'
stocks. Again, the effect is stronger for small relative to large cap stocks. In this research, we show that large events of de-
vastating nature to the economy can be considered as good news to some interest groups, such as stock market traders.
Overall, we show that investor optimism and pessimism induced by DRNs can significantly influence portfolio invest-
ment decisions in the pharmaceutical industry. Our findings are of utmost importance and practical usefulness for in-
stitutional and individual investors, portfolio managers, financial analysts, and pharmaceutical firms. Indeed, we identify a
range of exploitable investment opportunities. To this end, we design a number of trading strategies that involve a portfolio
of pharmaceutical stocks and the VIX. The results of the exercise unambiguously show that trading strategies yield positive
and significant returns. The outcome of this exercise is also useful for portfolio managers who provide advice for investors.
Financial analysts can provide a comprehensive analysis of investment opportunities in the pharmaceutical sector. Fur-
thermore, by issuing and selling new stocks to investors, pharmaceutical firms can benefit from increasing market valuation
and, hence, from lower cost of funding for R&D spending when an infectious disease outbreak occurs and accelerates.Acknowledgments
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See Tables A1 and A2.Table A1
Event days.
Date Disease Topic News
12/03/03a SARS WHO Statement PHEIC
17/03/03 SARS WHO Statement, WHO Disease Outbreak News WHO issues emergency travel advisory (15/03/03), Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) – multi-country outbreak – update (16/03/03)
18/03/03 SARS WHO Disease Outbreak News Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) multi-country outbreak – update
3
19/03/03 SARS WHO Disease Outbreak News Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) multi-country outbreak – update
4
20/03/03 SARS WHO Disease Outbreak News Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) multi-country outbreak – update
5
21/03/03 SARS WHO Disease Outbreak News Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) multi-country outbreak – update
6
01/04/03 SARS WHO Disease Outbreak News Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) – multi-country outbreak – up-
date 16
03/04/03 SARS WHO Disease Outbreak News Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) – multi-country outbreak – up-
date 20
07/04/03 SARS WHO Disease Outbreak News Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) – multi-country outbreak – up-
date 22 (05/04/03)
10/04/03 SARS WHO Disease Outbreak News Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) – multi-country outbreak – up-
date 26
14/04/03 SARS WHO Disease Outbreak News Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) – multi-country outbreak – up-
date 29
15/04/03 SARS WHO Disease Outbreak News Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) – multi-country outbreak – up-
date 30
16/04/03 SARS WHO Statement Coronavirus never before seen in humans is the cause of SARS
17/04/03 SARS WHO Disease Outbreak News, Statement Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) – multi-country outbreak – up-
date 32, Pasteur Institute signs deal with Glaxo to find SARS vaccine
21/04/03 SARS Research Funding, WHO Disease Outbreak News F.D.A. approval of nasal vaccine for flu expected (19/04/03), Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) – multi-country outbreak – update 35 (21/04/
03)
24/04/03 SARS WHO Disease Outbreak News Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) – Multi-country outbreak Update
38
28/04/03 SARS Research Funding, Statement GenVec Wins Government SARS Vaccine Contract, Roche aims to launch Sars
test by end July
29/04/03 SARS WHO Statement, WHO Disease Outbreak News WHO welcomes ASEAN unity against SARS, Severe Acute Respiratory Syn-
drome (SARS) – multi-country outbreak – update 42
30/04/03 SARS Statement Glaxo accelerates work on possible SARS vaccine
01/05/03 SARS WHO Disease Outbreak News Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) – multi-country outbreak – up-
date 44
06/05/03 SARS WHO Disease Outbreak News Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)-multi-country outbreak – update
48
09/05/03 SARS WHO Disease Outbreak News Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)-multi-country outbreak – update
51
23/05/03 SARS WHO Statement World Health Organization changes Hong Kong, Guangdong travel
recommendations
02/06/03 SARS WHO Disease Outbreak News Update 71 – status of diagnostic tests, training course in China
26/06/03 SARS Statement Pfizer sees progress against SARS
07/07/03 SARS WHO Statement SARS outbreak contained worldwide (05/07/03)
20/08/03 SARS WHO Statement Joint WHO, Food and Agriculture Organization and Chinese government
mission on SARS animal reservoir and possible transmission to Humans
21/08/03 SARS WHO Statement Joint mission on SARS animal reservoir and necessary next steps
26/09/03 SARS WHO Statement Inadequate plumbing systems likely contributed to SARS transmission
29/09/03 SARS Research Funding Baxter/Aventis receive 18 million USD SARS funding
05/11/03 SARS WHO Statement Global search for SARS vaccine gains momentum
17/12/03 SARS WHO Statement SARS case in laboratory worker in Taiwan, China
13/09/04 SARS Research Funding AlphaVax receives 4.8 million USD SARS vaccine grant
01/10/04 SARS Research Funding ID Biomedical announces NIH grant to develop nasally delivered SARS
vaccine
04/02/05 SARS Research Funding Novavax receives SARS vaccine funding from NIH
24/04/09 H1N1 WHO Statement Influenza-like illness in the United States and Mexico
27/04/09a H1N1 WHO Statement, WHO Disease Outbreak News,
Statement
PHEIC, Swine influenza – update 3, Mexico granted 205 million USD swine flu
loan from World Bank
28/04/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Swine influenza – update 4
29/04/09 H1N1 WHO Statement, WHO Disease Outbreak News Influenza A(H1N1), Influenza A(H1N1) – update 5
30/04/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Influenza A(H1N1) – update 6
Please cite this article as: Donadelli, M., et al., Dangerous infectious diseases: Bad news for Main Street, good news for
Wall Street? Journal of Financial Markets (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.finmar.2016.12.003i
Table A1 (continued )
Date Disease Topic News
01/05/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Influenza A(H1N1) – update 8.1
04/05/09 H1N1 WHO Statement, WHO Disease Outbreak News,
WHO Disease Outbreak News, WHO Disease
Outbreak News
Joint FAO/WHO/OIE/WTO Statement on Influenza A (H1N1) and the safety of
pork (02/05/09), Influenza A (H1N1) – update 10 (02/05/09), Influenza A
(H1N1) – update 12 (03/05/09), Influenza A (H1N1) – update 14
06/05/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Influenza A(H1N1) – update 18
07/05/09 H1N1 WHO Statement, WHO Disease Outbreak News WHO statement on pork and pork consumption, Influenza A(H1N1) – update
20
08/05/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Influenza A(H1N1) – update 22
11/05/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Influenza A(H1N1) – update 25
13/05/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Influenza A(H1N1) – update 27
15/05/09 H1N1 Gvt Order British government orders 90 million dosages of swine flu vaccine from
Baxter, Glaxo
18/05/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Influenza A(H1N1) – update 32
20/05/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Influenza A(H1N1) – update 34
22/05/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Influenza A(H1N1) – update 36
25/05/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Influenza A(H1N1) – update 38
27/05/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Influenza A(H1N1) – update 39
28/05/09 H1N1 Gvt Order Australia orders 10 million H1N1 vaccines
29/05/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Influenza A(H1N1) – update 41
01/06/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Influenza A(H1N1) – update 42
03/06/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Influenza A(H1N1) – update 43
08/06/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Influenza A(H1N1) – update 45
10/06/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Influenza A(H1N1) – update 46
11/06/09 H1N1 WHO Statement World now at the start of 2009 influenza pandemic
15/06/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Influenza A(H1N1) – update 49
17/06/09 H1N1 WHO Statement, WHO Disease Outbreak News WHO welcomes Sanofi-Aventis's donation of vaccine, Influenza A(H1N1) –
update 50
19/06/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News, Statement Influenza A(H1N1) – update 51, Secretary amended an earlier declaration,
providing immunity and enabling compensation (contingent upon appro-
priations) for the use of the antiviral drugs Tamiflu and Relenza for treatment
of illnesses caused by H1N1 pandemic flu
22/06/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Influenza A(H1N1) – update 52
24/06/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Influenza A(H1N1) – update 53
25/06/09 H1N1 Statement HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius issued a declaration under the PREP Act for
the use of H1N1 pandemic vaccines that are currently under development,
thereby providing immunity and enabling the compensation program, con-
tingent upon appropriations
26/06/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Influenza A(H1N1) – update 54
29/06/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Influenza A(H1N1) – update 55
01/07/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 – update 56
03/07/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 – update 57
06/07/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 – update 58
08/07/09 H1N1 WHO Statement Viruses resistant to oseltamivir (Tamiflu) identified
13/07/09 H1N1 WHO Statement WHO recommendations on pandemic (H1N1) 2009 vaccines
15/07/09 H1N1 Gvt Order France orders 94 mln doses of flu vaccine; GlaxoSmithKline, Sanofi, Novartis
23/07/09 H1N1 Gvt Order U.S. purchases 195 million doses of H1N1 Vaccine; CSL Limited, AstraZeneca,
Novartis, Sanofi, GlaxoSmithKline
24/07/09 H1N1 WHO Statement Preliminary information important for understanding the evolving situation
27/07/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 – update 59
31/07/09 H1N1 WHO Statement Pandemic influenza in pregnant women
04/08/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 – update 60
06/08/09 H1N1 WHO Statement Safety of pandemic vaccines
12/08/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 – update 61
13/08/09 H1N1 Gvt Order Australia orders 21 million doses of H1N1 vaccine; Roche, Sanofi, Glax-
oSmithKline, Novartis, Baxter, CSL Limited, Solvay
21/08/09 H1N1 WHO Statement, WHO Disease Outbreak News Recommended use of antivirals, Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 – update 62 (revised
21 August 2009)
28/08/09 H1N1 WHO Statement, WHO Disease Outbreak News Preparing for the second wave: lessons from current outbreaks, Pandemic
(H1N1) 2009 – update 63
04/09/09 H1N1 Gvt Order, WHO Disease Outbreak News Sinovac obtains initial order of H1N1 vaccine from Chinese Central Govern-
ment, Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 – update 64
11/09/09 H1N1 WHO Statement, WHO Disease Outbreak News Measures in school settings, Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 – update 65
15/09/09 H1N1 Approval Four companies are licensed to produce the 2009 H1N1 influenza vaccine for
the U.S.; CSL Limited, AstraZeneca, Novartis, Sanofi
18/09/09 H1N1 WHO Statement, WHO Disease Outbreak News Pandemic vaccine donations for the developing world, Pandemic (H1N1)
2009 – update 66
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Table A1 (continued )
Date Disease Topic News
24/09/09 H1N1 WHO Statement Pandemic influenza vaccines: current status
30/09/09 H1N1 Gvt Order Sinovac Biotech receives second H1N1 vaccine order from Chinese Central
Government
09/10/09 H1N1 Statement, WHO Disease Outbreak News NIH prepares to launch 2009 H1N1 influenza vaccine trial in people with
asthma, Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 – update 69
16/10/09 H1N1 WHO Statement Clinical features of severe cases of pandemic influenza
23/10/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 – update 71
30/10/09 H1N1 WHO Statement Experts advise WHO on pandemic vaccine policies and strategies
05/11/09 H1N1 WHO Statement Infection of farmed animals with the pandemic virus
06/11/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 – update 73
10/11/09 H1N1 WHO Statement, Approval Agreement for donation of pandemic H1N1 vaccine signed; GlaxoSmithKline,
CSL Limited swine flu vaccine now approved for infants
13/11/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 – update 74
19/11/09 H1N1 WHO Statement Safety of pandemic vaccines
20/11/09 H1N1 WHO Statement Public health significance of virus mutation detected in Norway
27/11/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 – update 76
02/12/09 H1N1 WHO Statement Oseltamivir resistance in immunocompromised hospital patients
03/12/09 H1N1 WHO Statement WHO use of advisory bodies in responding to the influenza pandemic
11/12/09 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 – update 78
22/12/09 H1N1 WHO Statement Comparing deaths from pandemic and seasonal influenza
07/01/10 H1N1 Gvt Order Cancel German states cancel swine flu vaccine orders
11/01/10 H1N1 Statement U.S. scales back H1N1 vaccine, cuts CSL order in half
22/01/10 H1N1 WHO Statement, WHO Disease Outbreak News Statement of the World Health Organization on allegations of conflict of in-
terest and ‘fake’ pandemic, Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 – update 84
05/02/10 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 – update 86
12/02/10 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 – update 87
26/02/10 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 – update 89
06/04/10 H1N1 Gvt Order Cancel U.K. Government cuts H1N1 vaccine order by two-thirds
16/04/10 H1N1 WHO Disease Outbreak News Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 – update 96
10/08/10 H1N1 WHO Statement H1N1 in post-pandemic period
22/05/12 SARS Research Funding Baylor College of Medicine receives over 6 million USD from NIH to develop
SARS vaccine
05/08/13 Polio Statement Japan steps up to help stop polio outbreak in Somalia
13/11/13 Polio WHO Statement WHO update on polio outbreak in Middle East
17/03/14 Polio WHO Disease Outbreak News Poliovirus in Cameroon – update
21/03/14 Polio WHO Disease Outbreak News Polio outbreak in the Middle East – update
24/03/14 Ebola WHO Disease Outbreak News Ebola virus disease in Guinea (23/03/14)
31/03/14 Polio Statement, WHO Disease Outbreak News Iraqi Ministry of Health declared a polio outbreak (30/03/14), Ebola virus
disease in Liberia (30/03/14)
07/04/14 Polio WHO Disease Outbreak News, Statement Ebola virus disease, West Africa – update (05/04/14), first mass vaccination
campaigns start since polio found in Iraq (06/04/14)
17/04/14 Polio WHO Disease Outbreak News Update on polio in central Africa – polio confirmed in Equatorial Guinea,
linked to outbreak in Cameroon
05/05/14a Polio WHO Statement PHEIC
22/05/14 Polio WHO Disease Outbreak News Wild poliovirus in the Horn of Africa
23/06/14 Polio WHO Disease Outbreak News Detection of poliovirus in sewage, Brazil
25/06/14 Polio WHO Disease Outbreak News Update on polio in central Africa
17/07/14 Polio WHO Disease Outbreak News Update on polio in Equatorial Guinea
18/07/14 H1N1 Statement Janssen Pharmaceuticals pays 30 million USD to develop Cambridge-based
Vertex Pharmaceuticals flu drug
31/07/14 Ebola WHO Disease Outbreak News Ebola virus disease, West Africa – update
06/08/14 Ebola WHO Statement WHO to convene ethical review of experimental treatment for Ebola
08/08/14a Ebola WHO Statement PHEIC
11/08/14 Polio Statement Mass polio vaccination campaign supported by WHO and UNICEF kicks off in
Iraq
12/08/14 Ebola WHO Statement Ethical considerations for use of unregistered interventions for Ebola virus
disease (EVD)
18/08/14 Ebola WHO Statement Statement on travel and transport in relation to Ebola virus disease outbreak
27/08/14 Ebola WHO Disease Outbreak News Ebola virus disease – Democratic Republic of Congo
28/08/14 Ebola WHO Statement WHO issues roadmap to scale up international response to the Ebola out-
break in west Africa
01/09/14 Ebola WHO Disease Outbreak News Ebola virus disease update – Senegal (30/08/14)
05/09/14 Ebola WHO Statement Statement on the WHO consultation on potential Ebola therapies and
vaccines
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Table A2
Pharmaceutical companies.
No. Name MCap Cap weight Cum sum 1 Cum sum 2
1 Pfizer 188,593.19 15.5172 15.5172 100.0000
2 Johnson & Johnson 180,892.81 14.8836 30.4008 84.4828
3 GlaxoSmithKline 124,710.26 10.2610 40.6617 69.5992
4 Merck & Co. 114,423.03 9.4146 50.0763 59.3383
5 Abbott Laboratories 73,520.95 6.0492 56.1255 49.9237
6 AstraZeneca 71,562.09 5.8880 62.0135 43.8745
7 Amgen 68,315.08 5.6209 67.6344 37.9865
8 Eli Lilly and Company 62,379.55 5.1325 72.7669 32.3656
9 Bristol-Myers Squibb 61,626.74 5.0706 77.8374 27.2331
10 Gilead Sciences 35,021.13 2.8815 80.7189 22.1626
11 Novo Nordisk 34,284.67 2.8209 83.5398 19.2811
12 Teva Pharmaceutical Industries 28,821.62 2.3714 85.9112 16.4602
13 Biogen 20,895.21 1.7192 87.6304 14.0888
14 Allergan 17,904.00 1.4731 89.1035 12.3696
15 Genzyme 14,939.50 1.2292 90.3327 10.8965
16 Forest Laboratories 13,182.62 1.0846 91.4174 9.6673
17 Valeant Pharmaceuticals International 9007.84 0.7412 92.1585 8.5826
18 Actavis 7885.84 0.6488 92.8074 7.8415
19 Elan Corporation 7077.87 0.5824 93.3897 7.1926
20 Mylan 6572.24 0.5408 93.9305 6.6103
21 Alexion Pharmaceuticals 6338.23 0.5215 94.4520 6.0695
22 Sigma-Aldrich 5935.03 0.4883 94.9403 5.5480
23 Vertex Pharmaceuticals 5909.63 0.4862 95.4265 5.0597
24 Regeneron Pharmaceuticals 5319.34 0.4377 95.8642 4.5735
25 Perrigo 4580.84 0.3769 96.2411 4.1358
26 Cephalon 4198.43 0.3454 96.5866 3.7589
27 Amylin Pharmaceuticals 2882.00 0.2371 96.8237 3.4134
28 IDEXX Laboratories 2858.65 0.2352 97.0589 3.1763
29 OSI Pharmaceuticals 2295.20 0.1888 97.2477 2.9411
30 Onyx Pharmaceuticals 2212.30 0.1820 97.4298 2.7523
31 NBTY 2154.64 0.1773 97.6070 2.5702
32 Bio-Techne 2134.91 0.1757 97.7827 2.3930
33 PDL BioPharma 1658.89 0.1365 97.9192 2.2173
34 Cubist Pharmaceuticals 1521.30 0.1252 98.0444 2.0808
35 Pharmacyclics 1377.55 0.1133 98.1577 1.9556
36 Immucor 1200.89 0.0988 98.2565 1.8423
37 Ionis Pharmaceuticals 1113.69 0.0916 98.3482 1.7435
38 Par Pharmaceutical 1078.85 0.0888 98.4369 1.6518
39 Nektar Therapeutics 1074.37 0.0884 98.5253 1.5631
40 Chattem 1023.82 0.0842 98.6096 1.4747
41 ViroPharma 945.58 0.0778 98.6874 1.3904
42 Martek Biosciences Corporation 906.69 0.0746 98.7620 1.3126
43 Questcor Pharmaceuticals. 857.44 0.0705 98.8325 1.2380
44 QLT 850.32 0.0700 98.9025 1.1675
45 NPS Pharmaceuticals 793.55 0.0653 98.9678 1.0975
46 Enzon Pharmaceuticals 699.04 0.0575 99.0253 1.0322
47 Meridian Bioscience 583.74 0.0480 99.0733 0.9747
48 USANA Health Sciences 524.64 0.0432 99.1165 0.9267
49 ImmunoGen 523.70 0.0431 99.1596 0.8835
Table A1 (continued )
Date Disease Topic News
08/09/14 Polio WHO Disease Outbreak News Poliovirus in Cameroon – update (06/09/14)
16/09/14 Ebola WHO Statement WHO welcomes the extensive Ebola support from the United States of
America
01/10/14 Ebola WHO Disease Outbreak News Ebola virus disease – united States of America
09/10/14 Ebola WHO Disease Outbreak News Ebola virus disease – Spain
28/10/14 Ebola WHO Statement WHO welcomes Swissmedic approval of Ebola vaccine trial at Lausanne
University Hospital
31/10/14 Ebola WHO Disease Outbreak News Ebola virus disease – Mali
06/11/14 Ebola WHO Statement WHO welcomes strong commitment from Australia to beating Ebola
Note: Disease-related news (event days).
a Indicates Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) events.
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Table A2 (continued )
No. Name MCap Cap weight Cum sum 1 Cum sum 2
50 Cambrex 518.72 0.0427 99.2022 0.8404
51 Vivus 485.42 0.0399 99.2422 0.7978
52 Neogen Corporation 472.80 0.0389 99.2811 0.7578
53 Quidel Corporation 396.04 0.0326 99.3137 0.7189
54 Geron 392.13 0.0323 99.3459 0.6863
55 CTI BioPharma 354.98 0.0292 99.3751 0.6541
56 AMAG Pharmaceuticals 354.75 0.0292 99.4043 0.6249
57 Amarin Corporation 353.94 0.0291 99.4335 0.5957
58 Celldex Therapeutics 339.25 0.0279 99.4614 0.5665
59 Astex Pharmaceuticals 328.90 0.0271 99.4884 0.5386
60 OraSure Technologies 323.29 0.0266 99.5150 0.5116
61 Xoma Corporation 312.45 0.0257 99.5407 0.4850
62 Progenics Pharmaceuticals 311.14 0.0256 99.5663 0.4593
63 Sarepta Therapeutics 270.25 0.0222 99.5886 0.4337
64 Cerus Corporation 269.78 0.0222 99.6108 0.4114
65 Novavax 261.06 0.0215 99.6323 0.3892
66 Flamel Technologies 252.94 0.0208 99.6531 0.3677
67 Hi-Tech Pharmaceuticals 230.69 0.0190 99.6720 0.3469
68 BioCryst Pharmaceuticals 227.57 0.0187 99.6908 0.3280
69 Depomed 218.50 0.0180 99.7087 0.3092
70 ArQule 211.10 0.0174 99.7261 0.2913
71 SciClone Pharmaceuticals 192.37 0.0158 99.7419 0.2739
72 Vical 191.09 0.0157 99.7577 0.2581
73 Peregrine Pharmaceuticals 191.09 0.0157 99.7734 0.2423
74 ARCA Biopharma 177.98 0.0146 99.7880 0.2266
75 Oncothyreon 163.07 0.0134 99.8015 0.2120
76 Trinity Biotech 161.77 0.0133 99.8148 0.1985
77 Discovery Laboratories 160.32 0.0132 99.8280 0.1852
78 Repligen 156.18 0.0129 99.8408 0.1720
79 Anika Therapeutics 131.30 0.0108 99.8516 0.1592
80 SIGA Technologies 130.37 0.0107 99.8623 0.1484
81 DUSA Pharmaceuticals 124.59 0.0103 99.8726 0.1377
82 CASI Pharmaceuticals 121.12 0.0100 99.8826 0.1274
83 Theragenics Corporation 117.74 0.0097 99.8922 0.1174
84 Repros Therapeutics 101.24 0.0083 99.9006 0.1078
85 La Jolla Pharmaceutical Company 100.30 0.0083 99.9088 0.0994
86 OncoGenex Pharmaceuticals 99.50 0.0082 99.9170 0.0912
87 Hemispherx Biopharma 99.27 0.0082 99.9252 0.0830
88 rEVO Biologics 96.88 0.0080 99.9332 0.0748
89 Poniard Pharmaceuticals 90.93 0.0075 99.9406 0.0668
90 CytRx 84.84 0.0070 99.9476 0.0594
91 Vericel Corporation 84.66 0.0070 99.9546 0.0524
92 Harbor Diversified 74.89 0.0062 99.9607 0.0454
93 AmpliPhi Biosciences 74.32 0.0061 99.9669 0.0393
94 Palatin Technologies 66.26 0.0055 99.9723 0.0331
95 Mateon Therapeutics 64.49 0.0053 99.9776 0.0277
96 Heska Corporation 56.34 0.0046 99.9823 0.0224
97 United-Guardian 54.06 0.0044 99.9867 0.0177
98 ProPhase Labs 52.64 0.0043 99.9910 0.0133
99 Teligent 39.72 0.0033 99.9943 0.0090
100 Natural Alternatives International 39.02 0.0032 99.9975 0.0057
101 Cyanotech Corporation 19.08 0.0016 99.9991 0.0025
102 ImmuCell Corporation 11.16 0.0009 100.0000 0.0009
Note: List of pharmaceutical companies sorted by market capitalization (MCap). MCap is the sample average during the analyzed period in millions of USD.
Market capitalization shares for each company are reported in column Cap weight. Cum sum 1 accumulates capitalization. The last column shows capi-
talization shares in reverse order, i.e., the overall capitalization attributed to the remaining firms, once the largest firms are accounted for.
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Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.finmar.
2016.12.003.References
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